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Dexterity and Degeneracy,  
for a “Neural Phenomenology”
Carmela Morabito
Nowadays the parallels between cognitive sciences and 
phenomenology are widely recognized. In this paper an attempt is made 
to look at them from a historic-epistemological perspective, focusing 
on the concept of ‘open architecture’ developed in the 40’s by the 
Soviet neuropsychologist Nikolaj Bernstein to explain the richness of 
intelligent behaviour in the light of the morphological and physiological 
details of the brain. Bernstein’s concept of “dexterity” will be analysed in 
relation to what Gerald Edelman calls the “degeneracy” of the nervous 
system, to emphasise the crucial role of “dynamical constraints” in the 
environment, in the human body with his sensory-motor capacities, and 
in the brain. hese two concepts refer to the “openness” of our mental 
and behavioural processes, whose plasticity is one of the conditions of 
possibility (à la Kant) of many species-speciic traits of human powerful 
adaptability to the environment. 
Phenomenology and Cognitive Neurosciences
«Among the fundamental properties of conscious experience are the 
following two: irst, consciousness is highly integrated or uniied—
every conscious state constitutes a uniied whole that cannot 
efectively be subdivided into independent components—and 
second, at the same time, it is highly diferentiated or informative—
there is an enormous number of diferent conscious states, each 
of which can lead to diferent behavioural consequences. he 
distributed neural processes underlying conscious experience also 
share these properties: they are highly integrated and, at the same 
 
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time, highly diferentiated. We believe that this convergence between 
neurobiology and phenomenology is not a mere coincidence»1.
he biggest challenge to contemporary cognitive neurosciences is 
explaining the cerebral mechanisms of consciousness, its emergence as a 
product of speciic neural processes and interactions between brain, body 
and environment. 
he aim is to understand how the general properties of consciousness 
emerge from the properties of brain as a complex system, a system whose 
functions constitutively need the interaction between the organism and 
its environment (also in a social and cultural sense).
Consciousness is a peculiar cerebral process with two main properties: 
it is extremely unitary (integrated) and complex (diferentiated) at the 
same time. he states of consciousness cannot be divided in single parts 
and are extraordinarily variable. 
he neural mechanisms of integration and diferentiation are worth 
analysing.
Which are the correlations between subjective experience and the 
brain, in its “open” architecture and functioning? 
In the second half of 20th century, cognitive psychology models 
underestimated the experiential dimension of consciousness. Assuming 
a theoretical frame clearly related to William James’ grounding of 
consciousness in the whole brain, contemporary neurosciences look 
instead for the neural basis of consciousness: not in single neurons or 
in single cerebral areas, but in complex systemic processes. Conscious 
experience is not the function of a single area of the brain, since it is 
associated with many activity pattern changes occurring simultaneously 
in many regions of the brain.
he neural processes at the basis of conscious experience share 
its main characteristics: unity, coherence, privateness and variability, 
the latter being essential to control the brain capacity of coping with 
innumerable and unpredictable situations. 
Studying the structure and dynamic functioning of the brain in 
diseases conirms the enormous variability and individuality of each 
single brain at all the levels in which it is organised, from biochemistry to 
morphology. Clinical data give an indisputable evidence of the organism’s 
1 G. M. Edelman, G. Tononi, A Universe of Consciousness. How Matter 
Becomes Imagination, p. 11
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struggle to overcome pathogenic factors. Neuropsychology has shown in 
how many diferent ways an organism can rapidly “re-integrate” himself 
after a lesion (e.g. in anosognosia or hemi-inattention) within an always 
changing network that is never interrupted. Dynamic integration allows 
the brain to “ill the gap” by surrogating—more or less—any impaired 
function.
At this point, two basic questions can be put forward: how can 
the brain maintain its unity and coherence despite being so deeply 
characterized by multiplicity and variability at the same time? How can 
intelligent behaviour vary continuously even when the organism’s goals 
remain the same?
An answer can be put forward starting from individual experience, 
from the analysis of behaviour.
Bernstein: 
Dexterity, Movement, Mind
It is exactly in the study of the connection between behaviour 
(even pathologic or dysfunctional) and brain functioning that Nikolai 
Alexandrovic Bernstein (1896-1966) inds the way to “enter” the mind-
body system in its dynamic and adaptive dimensions.
Bernstein aimed at understanding how the brain controls movement: 
in athletes, in labour movements (he founded and directed the 
Biomechanic Laboratory in the Central Institute of Labour in Moscow), 
and in the veterans wounded during the war—people sufering from 
diferent motor pathologies and dealing with their motor deicits in 
diferent ways. He devoted all his research activity to this topic, from the 
40’s to 1966, when he died.
«A rare case of a scientist who practically devoted his whole life to 
one problem: the physiological mechanisms of human movements and 
motor actions»: with these words Lurija refers to Bernstein’s studies on 
movement on a strictly physiological ground, without acknowledging 
the neuropsychological dimension of his studies on movement and brain 
and their relevance for a neurologically plausible model of the mind. 
But he studied movement to understand the brain, and the brain to 
understand the mind. In this connection lie the deeply heuristic value 
of his interdisciplinary approach and the relevance of his thought for 
cognitive neurosciences at large.
 
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Bernstein studied the origins and mechanisms of voluntary 
movement, the nature of movement coordination, motor skills and 
exercise, grounding his analysis in the concept of dexterity2.
he organism is constantly engaged in coping with an always 
changing environment; even the body and his motor capacities are 
always subtly changing. Assuming that to act dexterously is to adapt 
lexibly to many novel circumstances, dexterity is a special level of 
neuropsychological functioning: it is a process aimed at solving motor 
problems, not at producing particular patterns of movement, hence 
its psychological relevance. In that process, three elements are of 
fundamental importance: behaviour, mind and nervous system.
«Dexterity is the ability to ind a motor solution for any external 
situation, that is, to adequately solve any emerging motor problem
– correctly (i.e., adequately and accurately)
– quickly (with respect to both decision making and achieving a 
correct result)
– rationally (i.e., expediently and economically), and
– resourcefully (i.e., quick-wittedly and initiatively)»3.
With these words Bernstein summarizes his detailed analysis of 
dexterity and its main features. It is a psychophysical capacity, or 
rather an ability deining the relationship between the nervous system 
and skills. It refers to the quickness, agility, lexibility and skilfulness 
of the human body. It is exercisable and builds «a bridge to the area 
of genuine intellect»4, because it consists in inding a motor solution 
for any situation and in any condition; it therefore solves the problem 
correctly—that is, adequately and accurately, quickly and successfully.
With a very interesting terminological choice, Bernstein refers to the 
basic feature of dexterity with the term “extravertedness” just to posit 
the relation to the external world as the psychophysiological core of this 
concept: dexterity always refers to the environment and it always has an 
element of extemporaneousness. «Demand for dexterity is not in the 
2 N. Bernstein, «On Dexterity and Its Development», transl. by M. L. Latash, 
in: M. L. Latash, M. T. TurVeY (dir.), Dexterity and Its Development 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publisher, Mahwah, New Jersey, 1996. 
[1946-1947, originally published in Russia only in 1991].
3 N. Bernstein On Dexterity and Its Development, p. 228.
4 N. Bernstein, op. cit., p. 19.
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movements themselves, but in the surrounding conditions. […] It is not 
in the motor act itself but is revealed by its interaction with the changing 
external conditions»5.
Here lies the experiential dimension of the link between mind, body 
and behaviour: development leads to an increase in the requirements 
for an ability to adjust quickly to new, changing environments; to 
solve unexpected, nonstandard motor tasks; to successfully overcome 
unforeseen circumstances.
Dexterity, Movement, Nervous System
Considering the variability of behaviour and the many diferent ways 
the organism can adaptively answer to unforeseen requests from the 
environment (always restructuring his adaptive strategies on the basis 
of his experience and expectations), Bernstein emphasizes the existence 
of multiple choices in the brain to create new possible associative 
connections between external needs, the endogenous chemical activity 
and the organism’s goal-directed actions.
Plasticity, adaptability and lexibility are the main characteristics 
of the brain, underlying the capacity of complex organisms to adapt 
themselves to the most diverse environmental situations. With On 
Dexterity Bernstein challenged—in the 40’s—the very foundations of 
traditional psychological and neuroscientiic theories of behaviour with 
an ecological action-based theory of development. Dexterity is not a 
property of body movements as such, but a property of movement in 
situations. One cannot move dexterously; one can only solve a motor 
problem dexterously. According to Bernstein, if a real behavioural 
science has to be independent from the notion of relex and from 
Behaviourism, it has to be based on embodied-action, thus reasserting 
the primacy of actions. his primacy imposes a radical shift in skill 
acquisition theories and—more in general—in physiology6. With these 
5 N. Bernstein, op. cit., p. 208-210.
6 «Movements are the means by which the organism does not simply passively 
interact with the environment, but actively acts upon it in whatever way is 
necessary. … he remarkable structurality and completeness of a motor act 
makes it impossible to treat it as an arbitrary collection of successive relex 
elements … [We need] to ind a bridge between the physiology of reactions, 
with which psychophysiologists have been exclusively concerned for some 
 
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assumptions, Bernstein goes beyond the limits of traditional physiology 
based on the relex theory (either in its Pavlovian or Behavioural 
versions): the organism is a self-regulating system that reaches its goals 
on the basis of its genetic code, its sensory-motor capacities, and its 
environmental constraints. In so doing he produces a great qualitative 
change from within the materialistic and dialectic conception of the 
organism-environment relationship7.
Bernstein’s approach is a necessary shift from movement to action, 
from the body—with its many degrees of freedom—to efective 
behaviour and to mind: «it is the brain or the muscle the ruling Czar, 
when you jump, walk, or run?»8. 
Functional actions are primary and the control of movements and 
postures is secondary. Movements are not the building blocks of actions. 
In fact the control of movements is one of the results of the development 
of actions.
Bernstein summarized his theory of motor learning with the phrase 
“Repetition without Repetition” (a whole new way of thinking about 
behaviour): absolute repetition of a movement pattern is not possible 
time, and the physiology of activity» in N. Bernstein, he Coordination and 
Regulation of Movements, p. 144-147. Moving from the study of motor 
coordination Bernstein delineates a new conceptual frame: Physiology of 
Activity (not of simple reactions to stimuli), and in so doing he allows for 
a real consilience between neurophysiology, psychology and cybernetics, 
merging and synthesizing clinical and experimental data. To understand 
action, physiology and psychology, biomechanics and the Information 
heory need to be integrated. Had Bernstein’s Dexterity been published 
just when it was written, between 1946 and 1949, it would have ofered a 
powerful theoretical support to Gibson’s emerging ecological analysis. 
7 Leontjev clearly states that «in the theory of Marxism the teaching about 
human activity, about its development and its forms, has decisively 
important signiicance for psychology. As is known, Marx begins his 
remarkable heses on Feuerbach with the indication of the “chief defect 
of all hitherto existing materialism”. He believes that reality was taken by 
Feuerbach only in the form of an object, in the form of contemplation, and 
not as a human activity, not subjectively. […] Marx had in mind the fact 
that cognition was considered then only as the result of the efect of objects 
on the recognizing subject, on his sense organs, and not as a product of the 
development of his activity in an objective world» in A. LeontJeV, Activity, 
Consciousness, Personality, p. 39.
8 N. Bernstein, On dexterity and its development, p. 255.
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because of the inherent variability and complexity of the environment. 
According to the principles of self-organizing dynamics, Repetition 
without Repetition will tend to lead to the production of stable, smooth, 
and eicient solutions to motor problems.
his variability is not “noise” for the nervous system, but a 
fundamental environmental fact that exerts a selective pressure on the 
evolution of the nervous system.
his concept of motor learning brings to a new deinition—an 
ecological one—of what is learned and of motor skill: what is learned 
when a skill is acquired is typically the process of solving a speciic motor 
problem, not the abstract movements that might accompany the mature 
adult’s solution. here is a:
 «functional non-univocality between impulses and efects: Changes 
in muscle tension bring about a movement and the movement 
afects the condition of the muscles by shortening or stretching them 
causing further changes in their tension. […] Consequently, this 
form of interaction does not presuppose a one-to-one correspondence 
between force and movement, that is…one and the same sequence 
of changes in forces may produce diferent movements on successive 
repetitions»9.
he nervous system is not mechanical (as an input-output mechanism, 
indeed a merely reactive system); on the contrary it is an active self-
organizing, dynamic, system in which alterations in the activities of a 
single part may cause radical reorganizations of the whole10.
Motor dexterity is very closely related to the functioning of the 
brain cortex. hese brain areas are the youngest in the history of brain 
development, and they are, so to say, soaked with the ability to absorb 
one’s individual life experience. «Switchability and plasticity were born 
together with the brain cortex»11.
Bernstein’s ideas of the relationship between structure and function 
in the brain ofer a great contribution to what is called today “integrative 
neuroscience”: speciic brain areas (Brodmann areas) are considered 
9 N. Bernstein, he coordination and regulation of movement, p. 62.
10 «Movements are not to be seen as chains of details, rather as structured 
broken down into details; they are structural wholes, characterised at 
the same time by a high degree of differentiation of the elements and by 
differences in the relations among the parts» N. Bernstein, op. cit., p. 78.
11 N. Bernstein, On dexterity and its development, p. 222.
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as possible locations of functional operators participating in logical 
operations performed by certain neural networks. One and the same 
operator can participate in various external brain functions, which are 
based on certain combinations of many operators. 
«It would be very hard now to dispute the fact that the increase 
in the morphological, localizational diferentiation of the brain 
substrate is a very strong factor favouring the development of non-
local wave processes both inside and on the surface of the brain»12. 
Studying motor coordination, Bernstein deines the “true categories” 
(1935) for the organization of movement and of the brain itself in 
relation to mind. 
«Biological activity implies the cognition of the surrounding world 
through action and the regulation of action within it. his leads 
to knowledge through action and revision through practice which 
is the cornerstone of the entire dialectical-materialistic theory of 
knowledge»13. 
Edelman: a Neurobiological Theory of Mind
In the selectionistic theory of the brain (“Neural Darwinism”) 
formulated by Gerald M. Edelman (1929-2014)—that may be 
deined as “paradigmatic” of contemporary cognitive neurosciences—
redundancy, complexity, plasticity, individual and historical dimension 
play an essential role in understanding the brain in its development and 
stochastic and epigenetic functioning. Each brain is necessarily unique 
since it is continuously modiied by what one perceives and by the way 
one moves in the environment, i.e. by experience.
Diferent structures may have the same function or lead to the same 
result. his is what Edelman calls the Degeneracy of the nervous system: 
in the brain, extraordinary complex and degenerate neural pathways 
embody the epigenetic processes through which a great variability in 
anatomical structures and in neuronal connectivity is produced all along 
each individual’s life.
12 N. Bernstein, op. cit., p. 274.
13 N. Bernstein, he coordination and regulation of movement, p. 119-120.
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Each brain is unique. Adopting a selectionistic theory of the brain 
it is possible to correlate neural mechanisms and the phenomenological 
properties of consciousness, since the key properties of conscious 
experience emerge from the brain as a complex system whose rich 
functioning actually requires variability: «We emphatically do not 
identify consciousness in its full range as arising solely in the brain, since 
we believe that higher brain functions require interactions both with the 
world and with other persons»14.
Underlying consciousness there are neural processes that are at once 
highly integrated and continuously changing, thus highly diferentiated15. 
Consciousness emerges from this peculiar cerebral organization, at the 
same time deeply integrated and diferentiated, “sculpted” by individual 
experience and culture; «the brain is not organized like a computer, its 
functioning rests instead on such properties as variability, diferential 
ampliication, degeneracy and value»16.
«As intricate as the microstructure of neuronal connections may be, 
this intricacy is magniied by the number of diferent interactions, 
in space and time, that can afect synaptic transmission. he 
brain contains a variety of chemicals called neurotransmitters 
and neuromodulators that bind to a variety of receptors and act 
on various biochemical pathways. he chemical identity of these 
neurotransmitters and of their receptors, the statistic of their release, 
and the time and place of electrical and biochemical interactions all 
govern the thresholds of response of neurons in an extraordinarily 
intricate and variable manner. Furthermore, as a result of the release 
of the neurotransmitters, electrical signalling not only takes place, 
but leads to changes in the biochemistry and even in gene expression 
of the target neurons. his molecular intricacy and the resulting 
dynamics superimpose several more layers of variability on that of 
the neuroanatomical picture, contributing to what may be called the 
historical uniqueness of each brain»17. 
14 G. M. Edelman, G. Tononi, A universe of consciousness, p. XII.
15 Already in the late 19th century, Sherrington’s neurophysiological work 
suggested that integration keeps place with diferentiation; the same 
dialectic between integration and diferentiation is emphasized by Lashley 
in the 20’s.
16 G. M. Edelman, G. Tononi,  op. cit., p. 93.
17 G. M. Edelman, G. Tononi,  op. cit., p. 41-42.
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he key-concept to understand brain functioning is indeed 
“Degeneracy”18: it is a prominent characteristic of biological complexity 
and of evolution itself, being both a prerequisite for, and an inevitable 
outcome of, natural selection19. 
It is the ability of structurally diferent elements of a system to 
perform the same function or the same output; when applied to the 
18 his concept has a great salience in contemporary biological sciences: recent 
scientiic literature, especially in immunological and neurobiological ields, 
has paid increasing attention to Degeneracy as an organizing principle 
for describing the properties and the dynamics of complex biological 
networks. Shifting from its original physico-chemical meaning (in quantum 
theory, to deine diferent stationary states with diferent wave-functions 
corresponding to the same energy level), today it deines any class of objects 
in which diferent elements (i.e. inputs) could perform the same function 
(i.e. output). Degeneracy entered the Biological ield for the irst time 
thanks to Crick, in 1955 (on the relations between DNA and proteins). 
Immunology is the discipline that gave it a fundamental and wide-ranging 
explanatory role. Edelman proposes two diferent operative dimensions: 
1) at the level of antibody-gene repertoire, 2) at the organism’s level 
(assuming an analogy between somatic and natural selection mechanisms, 
Degeneracy is also a general evolutionary strategy to produce adaptability 
to unforeseen environments). he formation of a repertoire of degenerate 
neuronal circuits could then explain the brain as a modular system, giving 
it an evolutionary resilience (‘robustness’) to damage via the substitution 
of the damaged structure by others performing the same function (cfr. 
G. Tononi, O. Sporns, G. M. Edelman, «Measures of Degeneracy and 
redundancy in biological networks», Proceedings of the National Academy 
Sciences of USA, p. 3257-3262). It is possible to make various examples of 
Degeneracy at diferent levels of biological organization: the genetic code, 
the protein folding process, metabolism, immune responses, connectivity in 
neural networks and neural dynamics.
19 «A complex system may be considered as one in which smaller parts are 
functionally segregated or diferentiated across a diversity of functions 
but also as one that shows increasing degrees of integration when more 
and more of its parts interact. … Unlike redundant elements, degenerate 
elements can produce new and diferent outputs under diferent constraints. 
A degenerate system, which has many ways to generate the same output in 
a given context, is thus extremely adaptable in response to unpredictable 
changes in context and output requirements. he relevance to natural 
selection is obvious», in : G. M. Edelman, and J. GallY, «Degeneracy and 
complexity in biological systems», Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of USA, p. 13767. 
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nervous system it means that diferent populations of neurons can 
produce similar behavioural responses to identical external stimuli.
In a degenerate system, there is a partial functional overlap of 
elements already capable of non-rigid, lexible and versatile functionality: 
it is a “redundant functionality” that confers robustness, i.e. the ability 
to cope with variations in an operating environment with minimal 
damage, alteration or loss of functionality20. In this light, degeneracy 
makes it possible to substitute—or vicariate—impaired functions, since 
degenerate networks allow for widespread, compensatory adjustment: 
many neurological lesions that appear to have little efect upon behaviour 
within familiar contexts reveal the presence of degeneracy in the brain. 
he redundant functioning of a system composed of heterogeneous 
elements, therefore, requires degeneracy. 
he diference between redundancy and degeneracy is clear: unlike 
functional redundancy, which occurs when the same function is 
performed by identical elements, Degeneracy, which involves structurally 
diferent elements, may yield the same or diferent functions depending 
on the context in which it is expressed. 
«Evolution and natural selection necessarily are accompanied by 
degeneracy. It is a prerequisite of natural selection because natural 
selection can only operate among a population of genetically 
dissimilar organisms»21. 
he classical engineering concept of redundancy is opposite to that 
of degeneracy: the irst refers to the “one-to-one”, or “one structure-one 
function” paradigm, the second to the ‘many structures-one function’ 
paradigm. A structural advantage of degeneracy in comparison to 
redundancy, lies in the evolvability of the degenerate element and of the 
whole system: degenerate structures are functionally overlapping and 
versatile, and rearrange their coniguration to meet internal or external 
(environmental) changes thanks to their interchangeable task capabilities. 
Degenerate systems, then, show a lexibility that makes them capable to 
produce unforeseen functionalities (on a longer evolutionary time scale, 
this outcome coincides with the Gouldian concept of ex-aptation). 
20 Robustness can be deined as the ability to produce a non-catastrophic 
response to perturbation/noise in the system.
21 G. Edelman and J. GallY, op. cit., p. 13763.
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Neural Phenomenology?
In the correlation between the phenomenological analysis of 
behaviour, as grounded in the dynamical and experiential dimension 
of the individual, and cognitive neurosciences, a sort of “neural 
phenomenology” can be identiied, deeply dynamical and integrated.
On the basis of many complex population dynamics, diferent 
populations of neurons and synapses organize themselves on diferent 
levels to produce diferent functionally equivalent choices22. In this 
context action is the cornerstone: its dynamical link with perception 
makes it planned and modulated in an ever-changing complex 
environment. Action and cognition are deeply linked and the motor 
organization of behaviour needs, and produces, complex cognitive 
functions and consciousness. Complexity and consciousness are also 
strictly linked, and complexity is in the brain. Neuronal dynamical 
integration occurs along with the integration of consciousness.
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